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Abstract. It is the focus of this work to extend and study the previously proposed
quantum-like Bayesian networks (Moreira and Wichert, 2014, 2016) to deal with decision-
making scenarios by incorporating the notion of maximum expected utility in influence
diagrams. The general idea is to take advantage of the quantum interference terms pro-
duced in the quantum-like Bayesian Network to influence the probabilities used to compute
the expected utility of some action. This way, we are not proposing a new type of expected
utility hypothesis. On the contrary, we are keeping it under its classical definition. We
are only incorporating it as an extension of a probabilistic graphical model in a compact
graphical representation called an influence diagram in which the utility function depends
on the probabilistic influences of the quantum-like Bayesian network.
Our findings suggest that the proposed quantum-like influence digram can indeed take
advantage of the quantum interference effects of quantum-like Bayesian Networks to max-
imise the utility of a cooperative behaviour in detriment of a fully rational defect behaviour
under the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Keywords: Quantum Cognition; Quantum-Like Influence Diagrams; Quantum-Like Bayesian
Networks
1 Introduction
In this work, we extend the Quantum-Like Bayesian Network previously proposed by Moreira
and Wichert (2014, 2016) by incorporating the framework of expected utility. This extension is
motivated by the fact that quantum-like models tend to explain the probability distributions in
several decision scenarios where the agent (or the decision-maker) tends to act irrationally (Buse-
meyer and Bruza, 2012; Bruza et al., 2015). By irrational, we mean that an individual chooses
strategies that do not maximise or violate the axioms of expected utility. It is not enough to know
these probability distributions. On the contrary, it would be desirable to use this probabilistic
information to help us act upon a real world decision scenario. For instance, if a patient has
cancer, it is not enough for a doctor to know the probability distribution of success of different
treatments. The doctor needs act and choose a treatment based on specific information about
the patient and how this treatment will affect him/her. Probabilistic models are used in tasks
that reason under uncertainty, in other words, they are models that reach a conclusion based
on partial evidence. Decision-making models such as the expected utility hypothesis, are used to
decide how to act in the world. The main problem with such decision-making models is that it
is very challenging to determine the right action in a decision task where the outcomes of the
actions are not fully determined (Koller and Friedman, 2009). For this reason, we suggest to
extend the previously proposed Quantum-Like Bayesian Network to a Quantum-Like Influence
diagram where we take into account both the quantum-like probabilities (incorporating quantum
interference effects) of the various outcomes and the preferences of an individual between these
outcomes.
Generally speaking, an Influence diagram is a compact directed acyclical graphical representa-
tion of a decision scenario originally proposed by Howard and Matheson (1984) which consists in
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three types of nodes: random variables (nodes) of a Bayesian Network, action nodes representing
a decision that we need to make, and an utility function. The goal is to make a decision, which
maximises the expected utility function by taking into account probabilistic inferences performed
on the Bayesian Network. However, since influence diagrams are based on classical Bayesian Net-
works, then they cannot cope with the paradoxical findings reported over the literature.
It is the focus of this work to study the implications of incorporating Quantum-Like Bayesian
Networks in the context of influence graphs. By doing so, we are introducing quantum interference
effects that can disturb the final probability outcomes of a set of actions and affect the final
expected utility. We will study how one can use influence diagrams to explain the paradoxical
findings of the prisoners dilemma game based on expected utilities.
2 Revisiting the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Expected Utility
Hypothesis
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game consists in two players who are in two separate confinements with
no means of communicating with each other. They were offered a deal: if one defects against the
other, he is set free while the other gets a heavy charge. If they both defect, they get both a big
charge and if they both cooperate by remaining silent, they get a small charge. Figure 1 shows
an example of a payoff matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma used in the experiments of Shafir and
Tversky (1992) where the goal is to score the maximum number of points.
Fig. 1. Example of a payoff matrix used in the Shafir and Tversky (1992) Prisoner’s Dilemma experiment
Looking at the payoff matrix, one can see that the best action for both players is to cooperate,
however experimental findings show that the majority of the players choose to defect even when
it is known that the other player chose to cooperate. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a clear example of
how two perfectly rational individuals choose to defect (they prefer an individual reward), rather
than choosing the option which is best for both (to cooperate). The expected utility hypothesis
is a framework that enables us to explain why this happens.
The expected utility hypothesis corresponds to a function designed to take into account de-
cisions under risk. It consists of a choice of a possible set of actions represented by a probability
distribution over a set of possible payoffs (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953). It is given by
Equation 1,
EU =
∑
i
Pr(xi) · U(xi), (1)
where U(xi) is an utility function associated to event xi.
In the experiment of Shafir and Tversky (1992), the participant needed to choose between de
actions defect or cooperate. We will address to this participant as player 2, P2 and his opponent,
to player 1, P1. According to the expected utility hypothesis, P2 would have to choose the action
that would grant him the highest expected utility. Assuming that we do not know what P1 chose
(so we model this with a neutral prior of 0.5), we can compute the expected utility of Player 2 as
EU [Defect] = 0.5× U(P1 = D,P2 = D) + 0.5× U(P1 = C,P2 = D) = 57.5,
EU [Cooperate] = 0.5× U(P1 = D,P2 = C) + 0.5× U(P1 = C,P2 = C) = 50.
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Note that U(P1 = x, P2 = y) corresponds to the utility of player 1 choosing action x and player
2 choosing action y. The calculations show that the action that maximises the player’s expected
utility is Defect. This is what it is known as the Maximum Expected Utility hypothesis (MEU).
In the end of the 70’s, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky showed in a set of experiments
that in many real life situations, the predictions of the expected utility were completely inaccurate
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This
means that a decision theory should be predictive in the sense that it should say what people
actually do choose, instead of what they must choose. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is one of the
experiments that show the inaccuracy of the expected utility hypothesis by showing violations to
the laws of classical probability. Table 1 summarises the results of several words of the literature
reporting violations to the total law of classical probability. All of these works tested three
conditions in the Prisoners Dilemma Game: (1) the player knows the other defected ( Known to
Defect), (2) the player knows the other cooperated (Known to Collaborate), (3) the player does
not know the other player’s action (Unknown). This last condition shows a deviation from the
classical probability theory, suggesting that there is a significant percentage of players who are
not acting according to the maximum expected utility hypothesis.
Literature Known to Defect Known to Collaborate Unknown Classical Probability
Shafir and Tversky (1992) 0.9700 0.8400 0.6300 0.9050
Li and Taplin (2002) (Average) 0.8200 0.7700 0.7200 0.7950
Li and Taplin (2002) Game 1 0.7333 0.6670 0.6000 0.7000
Li and Taplin (2002) Game 2 0.8000 0.7667 0.6300 0.7833
Li and Taplin (2002) Game 3 0.9000 0.8667 0.8667 0.8834
Li and Taplin (2002) Game 4 0.8333 0.8000 0.7000 0.8167
Li and Taplin (2002) Game 5 0.8333 0.7333 0.7000 0.7833
Li and Taplin (2002) Game 6 0.7667 0.8333 0.8000 0.8000
Li and Taplin (2002) Game 7 0.8667 0.7333 0.7667 0.8000
Table 1. Works of the literature reporting the probability of a player choosing to defect under several
conditions. The entries of the table that are highlighted correspond to experiments where the violations
of the sure thing principle were not found.
Table 1 presents several examples where the principle of maximum expected utility is not, in
general, an adequate descriptive model of human behaviour. In fact, people are often irrational,
in the sense that their choices do not satisfy the principe of maximum expected utility relative
to any utility function (Koller and Friedman, 2009).
Previous works in the literature have proposed quantum-like probabilistic models that try to
accommodate these paradoxical scenarios and violations to the Sure Thing Principle (Busemeyer
et al., 2006b, 2009; Aerts et al., 2017; Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009; Busemeyer and Bruza,
2012). There is also a vast amount of work in trying to extend the expected utility hypothesis to
a quantum-like versions Mura (2009); Yukalov and Sornette (2015). However, the expected utility
framework alone poses some difficulties, since it is very challenging the task of decision-making
in situations where the outcomes of an action are not fully determined (Koller and Friedman,
2009).
In this paper, we try to fill this gap by taking into account the quantum-like probability
inferences produced by a quantum-like Bayesian network to various outcomes and extend these
probabilities to influence the preferences of an individual between these outcomes. Note that the
probabilistic inferences produced by the quantum-like Bayesian network will suffer quantum in-
terference effects in decision scenarios under uncertainty. The general idea is to use these quantum
interference effects to influence the expected utility framework in order to favour other actions
than what would be predicted from the classical theory alone. We will combine this structure in
a directed and acyclic compact probabilistic graphical model for decision-making, which we will
define as the quantum-like influence diagram.
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3 A Quantum-Like Influence Diagram for Decision-Making
A Quantum-Like Influence Diagram is a compact directed acyclical graphical representation of a
decision scenario, which was originally proposed by Howard and Matheson (1984). It consists on a
set of random variables X1, . . . , XN belonging to a quantum-like Bayesian network. Each random
variable Xi is associated with a conditional probability distribution (CPD) table, which describes
the distribution of quantum probability amplitudes of the random variable Xi with respect to its
parent nodes, ψ(Xi|PaXi). Note that the difference between a quantum-like Bayesian network
and a classical network is simply the usage of complex numbers instead of classical real numbers.
The usage of complex numbers will enable the emergence of quantum interference effects. The
influence diagram also consists in an utility node defined variable U , which is associated with a
deterministic function U(PaU ). The goal is to make a decision, which maximises the expected
utility function by taking into account probabilistic inferences performed on the quantum-like
Bayesian network.
Fig. 2. General example of a Quantum-Like Influence Diagram comprised of a Quantum-Like Bayesian
Network, X1, ..., XN , a Decision Node, D, and an Utility node with no children, U .
An example of a quantum-like influence diagram is presented in Figure 2. In the Figure, one
can notice the three different types of nodes: (1) random variable nodes (circle-shape), denoted
by X1, · · · , XN , of some Quantum-Like Bayesian Network, (2) a decision node (rectangle-shape),
denoted by D, which corresponds to the decision that we want to make, and (3) an Utility node
(diamond-shape), denoted by U , which in the scope of this paper, will represent the payoffs in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
The goal is to maximise the expected utility by taking into consideration the probabilistic
inferences of the quantum-like bayesian network, which makes use of the quantum interference
effects to accommodate and predict violations to the Sure Thing Principle.
In the next sections, we will address each of these three components separately.
4 Quantum-Like Bayesian Networks
Quantum-like Bayesian Network have been initially proposed by Moreira and Wichert (2014,
2016) and they can be defined by a directed acyclic graph structure in which each node represents
a different quantum random variable and each edge represents a direct influence from the source
node to the target node. The graph can represent independence relationships between variables,
and each node is associated with a conditional probability table that specifies a distribution
of quantum complex probability amplitudes over the values of a node given each possible joint
assignment of values of its parents. In other words, a quantum-like Bayesian Network is defined
in the same way as classical network with the difference that real probability values are replaced
by complex probability amplitudes.
In order to perform exact inferences in a quantum-like Bayesian network, one needs to compute
the:
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– Quantum-Like full join probability distribution. The quantum-like full joint complex
probability amplitude distribution over a set of N random variables ψ(X1, X2, ..., XN ) cor-
responds to the probability distribution assigned to all of these random variables occurring
together in a Hilbert space. Then, the full joint complex probability amplitude distribution
of a quantum-like Bayesian Network is given by:
ψ(X1, . . . , XN ) =
N∏
j=1
ψ(Xj |Parents(Xj)) (2)
Note that, in Equation 2, Xi is the list of random variables (or nodes of the network),
Parents(Xi) corresponds to all parent nodes of Xi and ψ (Xi) is the complex probability
amplitude associated with the random variable Xi. The probability value is extract by apply-
ing Born’s rule, that is, by making the squared magnitude of the joint probability amplitude,
ψ (X1, . . . , XN ):
Pr(X1, . . . , XN ) = |ψ(X1, . . . , XN )|2 (3)
– Quantum-Like Marginalization. Given a query random variable X and let Y be the un-
observed variables in the network, the marginal distribution of X is simply the amplitude
probability distribution of X averaging over the information about Y . The quantum-like
marginal probability for discrete random variables, can be defined by Equation 4. The sum-
mation is over all possible y, i.e., all possible combinations of values of the unobserved values
y of variable Y . The term γ corresponds to a normalisation factor. Since the conditional
probability tables used in Bayesian Networks are not unitary operators with the constraint
of double stochasticity (like it is required in other works of the literature (Busemeyer et al.,
2006b; Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009)), we need to normalise the final scores. This normalisa-
tion is consistent with the notion of normalisation of wave functions used in Feynman’s Path
Diagrams.
In classical Bayesian inference, on the other hand, normalisation is performed due to the
independence assumptions made in Bayes rule.
Pr(X|e) = γ
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
y
N∏
k=1
ψ(Xk|Parents(Xk), e, y)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(4)
Expanding Equation 4, it will lead to the quantum marginalisation formula (Moreira and
Wichert, 2014), which is composed by two parts: one representing the classical probability and
the other representing the quantum interference term (which corresponds to the emergence
of destructive / constructive interference effects):
Pr(X|e) = γ
|Y |∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣
N∏
k
ψ(Xk|Parents(Xk), e, y = i)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ 2 · Interference (5)
Interference =
|Y |−1∑
i=1
|Y |∑
j=i+1
∣∣∣∣∣
N∏
k
ψ(Xk|Parents(Xk), e, y = i)
∣∣∣∣∣·
∣∣∣∣∣
N∏
k
ψ(Xk|Parents(Xk), e, y = j)
∣∣∣∣∣·cos(θi−θj)
Note that, in Equation 5, if one sets (θi − θj) to pi/2, then cos(θi − θj) = 0. This means that
the quantum interference term is canceled and the quantum-like Bayesian Network collapses to
its classical counterpart.
Formal methods to assign values to quantum interference terms are still an open research
question, however some work has already been done towards that direction (Yukalov and Sornette,
2011; Moreira and Wichert, 2016, 2017).
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5 Maximum Expected Utility in Classical Influence Diagrams
Given a set of possible decision rules, δA, the goal of Influence Diagrams is to compute the decision
rule that leads to the Maximum Expected Utility.
EU [D [δA]] =
∑
x
PrδA (x|a)U (x, a) (6)
The goal is to choose some action a that maximises the expected utility:
a∗ = argmaxδAEU [D [δA]]
One can map the expected utility formalism to the scope of Bayesian networks in the following
way. In the expected utility formula, Prδa(x|a) corresponds to a full joint probability distribution
of all possible outcomes, x, given different actions a. This means that we can decompose the full
joint probability distribution to the chain rule of probability theory as the product of each node
with its parent nodes.
EU [D [δA]] =
∑
x
PrδA (x|a)U (x, a) (7)
EU [D [δA]] =
∑
X1,...,Xn,A
((∏
i
Pr (Xi|PaXi)
)
U (PaU ) δA (A|Z)
)
(8)
In Equation 8, Z = PaA represents the parent nodes of action A. We can factorise Equation 8
in terms of the decision rule, δA, obtaining
EU [D [δA]] ==
∑
Z,A
δA (A|Z)
(∑
W
(∏
i
Pr (Xi|PaXi)
)
U (PaU )
)
, (9)
where W = {X1, . . . , XN} − Z corresponds to all nodes of the Bayesian Network that are not
contained in the set of nodes in Z.
By marginalising the summation over W , we obtain an expected utility formula that is written
only in terms of the factor µ(A,Z). Note that this factor corresponds to a conditional distribution
table of random variable Z (the outcomes of some action a) and action a.
EU [D [δA]] =
∑
Z,A
δA (A|Z)µ (A,Z) (10)
The Maximum Expected Utility for a classical Influence Diagrams is given by (Koller and
Friedman, 2009):
δ∗A (a, Z) = α(x) =
{
1 a = argmax (A,Z)
0 otherwise
(11)
6 Maximum Expected Utility in Quantum-Like Influence Diagrams
The proposed quantum-like influence diagram is built upon the formalisms of quantum-like
Bayesian networks. This means that real classical probabilities need to be replaced by complex
quantum amplitudes.
We start the derivation with the initial notion of expected utility already presented in the
previous section.
EU [D [δA]] =
∑
x
PrδA (x|a)U (x, a) (12)
For simplicity, let’s consider the decision scenario where we have two binary events X1 and
X2. Then, we can decompose the classical expected utility equation as
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EU [D [δA]] =
∑
X1,X2,A
δA(A|X1)Pr (X1)Pr (X2|X1)U (X1, A) (13)
Like before, we can factorise this formula in terms of the decision rule δA, obtaining
EU [D [δA]] =
∑
A,X2
δA(A|X2)
∑
X1
Pr (X1)Pr (X2|X1)U (X1, A) (14)
For binary events, we obtain the marginalisation of X1 over both X2 and D
EU [D [δA]] =
∑
A,X2
δA(A|X2) · µ (X2, A) (15)
where µ (X2, A) is a factor with the utility function expressed in terms of the distribution of
X1. More specifically, it is given by
µ (X2, A) = Pr (X1 = t)Pr (X2|X1 = t)U (X1 = t, A) +
+Pr (X1 = f)Pr (X2|X1 = f)U (X1 = f,A)
(16)
Since the proposed quantum-like influence diagram makes use of a quantum-like Bayesian net-
work, this means that we need to convert the classical real probabilities into complex quantum
amplitudes. This is performed by applying Born’s rule: for some classical probability A, the cor-
responding quantum amplitude is simply its squared magnitude, Pr(A) = |ψA|2 (Deutsch, 1988;
Zurek, 2011). Since in Equation 16 we have a combination of utility functions with probability
values, we cannot apply Born’s rule directly, since we would not be satisfying its definition. For
this reason, we propose to split Equation 16 into a vector representation containing a classical
probability and another containing the utility function. This procedure is similar to the one pro-
pose in the Quantum Decision Theory model of Yukalov and Sornette (2015) where the authors
separate a prospect into an utility factor (a factor containing the classical utility of a lottery) and
an attraction factor (a probabilistic factor that results from the quantum interference effect).
Considering pia the vector representation of a classical probability vector and ua the classical
utility corresponding to the choice of some action A, then we obtain
pia = Pr (X1 = t)Pr (X2|X1 = t) + Pr (X1 = f)Pr (X2|X1 = f)
ua = U (X1 = t, A) + U (X1 = f,A)
We can apply Born’s rule by replacing classical real numbers by quantum-like amplitudes and
performing their squared magnitude as
pia = |qa|2 ⇔ qa = |ψ(X1 = t)ψ(X2|X1 = t) + ψ(X1 = f)ψ(X2|X1 = f)|2
qa = |ψ(X1 = t)ψ(X2|X1 = t)|2 + |ψ(X1 = f)ψ(X2|X1 = f)|2 + Interf,
(17)
where the quantum interference term is given by
Interf = 2 |ψ(X1 = t)ψ(X2|X1 = t)| |ψ(X1 = f)ψ(X2|X1 = f)|Cos (θ1 − θ2) . (18)
The utility factor ua needs to be updated in order to become a factor of the quantum inter-
ference term.
ua = U (X1 = t, A) + U (X1 = f,A) + U (X1 = t, A) · U (X1 = f,A)
The result of this marginalisation, µ (X2, A), will be given by the product of the vector
representation of these two terms:
µ (X2, A) = 〈qa|ua〉,
where the vector representation corresponds to
|qa〉 =
 |ψ(X1 = t)ψ(X2|X1 = t)|2|ψ(X1 = f)ψ(X2|X1 = f)|2
Interf
 |ua〉 =
 U (X1 = t, A)U (X1 = f,A)
U (X1 = t, A)U (X1 = f,A)
 .
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This way, the final marginalisation for the quantum-like influence diagram is
µ (X2, A) = 〈qa|ua〉 =
|ψ(X1 = t)ψ(X2|X1 = t)|2 · U (X1 = t, A) + |ψ(X1 = f)ψ(X2|X1 = f)|2 · U (X1 = f,A) + . . .
+Interf · U (X1 = t, A)U (X1 = f,A)
(19)
Note that, in Equation 19, if one sets the interference term (θi−θj) to pi/2, then cos(θi−θj) =
0. This means that the quantum interference term is canceled and the quantum-like influence
diagram collapses to its classical counterpart. In other words, one can see the quantum-like
influence diagram as a more general and abstract model of the classical diagram, since it represents
both classical and quantum behaviour.
Finally, the Maximum Expected Utility for Quantum-Like Influence Diagrams is given by:
δ∗A (a, Z) = α(x) =
{
1 a = argmax µ (X2, A)
0 otherwise
(20)
7 A Quantum-Like Influence Diagram for the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game
Several paradoxical findings have been reported over the literature showing that individuals do
not act rationally in decision scenarios under uncertaint (Kuhberger et al., 2001; Tversky and
Shafir, 1992; Lambdin and Burdsal, 2007; Hristova and Grinberg, 2008; Busemeyer et al., 2006a)..
The quantum-like influence diagram can help to accommodate and explain the several para-
doxical decisions by manipulating the quantum interference effects that emerge from the infer-
ences in the quantum-like Bayesian network. These inferences can then be used to reestimate the
expected utility of an agent.
Fig. 3. Quantum-Like Infleunce Diagram representing the Prisoner’s DIlemma Experiment from (Shafir
and Tversky, 1992).
We will model the works previously reported in Table 1 under the proposed quantum-like
influence diagram. Figure 3 corresponds to the representation of the work of Shafir and Tversky
(1992). The three types of nodes in the represented quantum-like influence diagram are the
following:
– Random Variables: the circle-shaped nodes are the random variables belonging to the
quantum-like bayesian network representing the player that needs to make a decision in the
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Prisoner’s Dilemma, without being aware of the decision of his opponent. We modelled this
network with two binary random variables, X1 and X2. X1 corresponds to the player’s own
strategy (either to defect or to cooperate) and X2 the player’s personal risk preferences, i.e.
either he is risk averse (and therefore would find it safe to engage in a defect strategy) or
he is risk seeking (and would prefer to engage in a cooperate strategy). The tables next to
each random variable are conditional probability tables and they show the probability distri-
bution of the variable towards its parent nodes. These conditional probability tables match
the probability distributions reported in Table 1. In the specific case of Figure 3, this table
is filled with the values of the probability amplitudes identified in the work of Shafir and
Tversky (1992). For the general case, we will assume that the player has no initial strategy
and we will assume neutral priors for the variable X1 (like it was assumed in previous works
of the literature, see Moreira and Wichert (2016)).
– Action Node: the rectangle shaped node is the action that we want to make a decision. In
the context of the prisoner’s dilemma we are interested to compute the maximum expected
utility of defecting or not defecting (i.e. cooperating).
– Utility Node: the diamond shaped node corresponds to the payoffs that the player will
have for taking (or not) the action defect, given his own personal preferences towards risk.
The values in this node will be populated with the different payoffs used across the different
experiments of the prisoner’s dilemma reported over the literature.
In the conditions where the player knows the strategy of his opponent, the quantum-like
influence diagram collapses to its classical counterpart, since there is no uncertainty. This was
already noticed in the previous works of Moreira and Wichert (2014, 2016, 2017). However, when
the player is not informed about his opponent’s decision, then the quantum-like Bayesian network
will produce interference effects (Equation 5). When computing the maximum expected utility, we
will marginalise out X1 like it was shown in Equation 16. This will result in a factor showing the
distribution of the player’s personal preferences towards risk (either risk averse or risk seeking)
towards his actions (either to defect or cooperate). The quantum interference term will play an
important role to determine which quantum parameters can influence the player’s decision to
switch from a classical (and rational) defect action towards the paradoxical decision found in the
works the literature, i.e. to cooperate.
Fig. 4. Impact of quantum interference terms in the overall expected utility: (left) quantum parameters
that maximize a cooperate decision, (center) variation of the expected utility when the player is risk
averse and (right) variation of the expected utility when the player is risk seeking.
Figure 4 demonstrates the impact of the quantum interference effects in the player’s decision.
The graphs in the centre and in the right of Figure 4 represent all possible maximum expected
utilities that the player can achieve by varying the quantum interference term θ in Equation 19
for a personal preference of being risk averse or risk seeking, respectively. On the left of Figure 4,
it is represented all the values of θ that satisfy the condition that EU [Cooperate] > EU [Defect],
i.e., all the values of the quantum interference parameter θ that will maximise the utility of
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cooperation rather than defect. One can note that, for experiment of Shafir and Tversky (1992)
(as well as in the remaining works of the literature analysed in this work), one can maximise
the expected utility of Cooperation when the utilities are negative. This is in accordance with
the previous study of Moreira and Wichert (2016) in which the authors found that violations to
the Sure Thing Principle imply destructive (or negative) quantum interference effects. As we will
see in the next section, the quantum parameters found that are used to maximise the expected
utility of a cooperate action lead to destructive quantum interferences and can exactly explain
the probability distributions observed in the experiments.
7.1 Results and Discussion
Although there are several quantum parameters that satisfy the relationship that shows that
participants can maximise the utility of a cooperate action, only a few parameters are able to
accommodate both the paradoxical probability distributions reported in the several works in
the literature and to maximise the expected utility of cooperating. For instance, Figures 5 and 6
show how the quantum parameters are sensitive to accommodate the violations of the Sure Thing
Principle in terms of the probability distributions. The slight variation of the quantum parameter
θ in the quantum-like Bayesian network can lead to completely different probability distributions
which differ from the ones observed in the difference experimental scenarios reported in the
literature. These probability distributions will influence the utilities computed by the expected
utility framework.
Fig. 5. Probabilities that can be obtained
in Game 2 of Li and Taplin (2002).
Fig. 6. Probabilities that can be obtained
in Game 2 of Li and Taplin (2002).
In Table 2, it is presented the quantum parameters that lead to the quantum interference
term that is necessary to fully explain and accommodate the violations to the sure thing principle
reported over several works of the literature.
Shafir and Tversky (1992) Li and Taplin (2002) G1 Li and Taplin (2002) G2 Li and Taplin (2002) G3 Li and Taplin (2002) G4 Li and Taplin (2002) G5 Li and Taplin (2002) G6 Li and Taplin (2002) G7
Prob of Defect
(Known to Defect) 0.9700 0.7333 0.8000 0.9000 0.8333 0.8333 0.7667 0.8667
Prob of Cooperate
(Known to Cooperate) 0.8400 0.6670 0.7667 0.8667 0.8000 0.7333 0.8333 0.7333
Classical Prob
(Unknown condition) 0.9050 0.7000 0.7833 0.8834 0.8167 0.7833 0.8000 0.8000
Experim Prob
(Unknown condition) 0.6300 0.6000 0.6300 0.8667 0.7000 0.7000 0.8000 0.7667
Quantum Interference
θ param 2.8151 3.0170 3.0758 2.8052 3.2313 2.8519 1.5708 3.7812
Table 2. Experimental results reported for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The entries highlighted cor-
respond to games that are not violating the Sure Thing Principle.
For this reason, we decided to test if the quantum-like parameters used to accommodate the
violations to the Sure Thing Principle were sufficient and if they could also lead to a maximisation
of expected utility of cooperation. We performed simulations of the different works in the liter-
ature and we concluded that the quantum interference effects that can accommodate violations
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to the violations of the Sure Thing Principle in the quantum-like Bayesian network alone, also
explain a higher preference of the cooperative action over defect. Table 3 presents the results.
Li and Taplin (2002)
Shafir and Tversky (1992) Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 Game 5 Game 6 Game 7
MEU MEU MEU MEU MEU MEU MEU MEU MEU MEU MEU MEU MEU MEU MEU MEU
(coop) (def) (coop) (def) (coop) (def) (coop) (def) (coop) (def) (coop) (def) MEU MEU (coop) (def)
CL Rk Av 43.63 50.25 34.19 39.35 38.75 61.78 26.85 50.33 65.70 67.33 16.27 34.50 17.58 36.50 16.43 35.00
CL Rk Sk 6.38 7.25 15.82 18.15 11.25 17.22 3.65 26.85 14.80 15.17 5.23 10.5 3.92 8.50 5.07 10.00
QL Rk Av -1559.46 -2129.94 -1263.63 -1730.21 -1422.69 -4787.28 -702.24 -2075.58 -5198.14 -5462.41 -221.05 -1313.94 28.83 36.49 -184.75 -1116.33
QL Rk Sk 116.66 -160.08 -538.62 -735.89 -392.89 -1320.22 -94.44 -270.75 -1162.55 -1221.47 -61.44 -353.22 3.91 8.50 -44.86 -262.30
QL Interf
θ1 − θ2 2.815 2.815 3.017 3.017 3.0758 3.0758 2.805 2.805 3.23 3.23 2.8519 2.8519 1.5708 1.5708 3.78 3.78
Payoff
dd dc 30 25 30 25 73 25 30 25 80 78 43 10 30 10 30 10
cd cc 85 75 85 75 85 75 85 36 85 83 85 46 60 33 60 33
Table 3. Results obtained after performing inferences in the quantum-like influence diagram for different
works of the literature reporting violations of the Sure Thing Principle in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
One can see that the Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) was changed to favour a Cooperate strategy using
the quantum interference effects of the Quantum-Like Bayesian Network. In the payoffs, d corresponds
to defect and c to cooperate. The first payoff corresponds to player 1 and the second to player 2.
In Table 3, we present the MEU computed for each work in the literature using the classical
approach for the different personal preferences of the individual towards risk: either risk seeking
(CL Rk Sk) or risk averse (CL Rk Av). The classical MEU shows that the optimal strategy is
to defect even if the individual has a risk seeking personality (who would be willing to bet on
a cooperate action). Of course these results go against the experimental works of the literature
which say that a significant percentage of individuals engaged in cooperative strategies.
In opposition, when we use the quantum-like influence diagram, we take advantage of the quan-
tum interference terms that will disturb the probabilistic outcomes of the quantum-like Bayesian
networks. Since the utility function depends on the outcomes of the quantum-like Bayesian net-
work, then it is straightforward that quantum interference effects influence indirectly the outcomes
of the MEU allowing us to favour a different strategy predicted by the classical MEU.
It is interesting to notice that indeed the parameters used accommodate the violations of the
Sure Thing Principle alone in the quantum-like Bayesian Network could also be used to maximise
the utility of a Cooperate action. This was verified in all works of the literature analysed except
in Game 6 in the work of Li and Taplin (2002). The reason is that Game 6 is not even reporting
a violation to the Sure Thing Principle and could be explained by the classical theory with a
minor error percentage. So, if it can be explained under the classical theory, then of course it also
tends to favour a defect action over a cooperate one.
8 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed an extension of the quantum-like Bayesian Network initially proposed
by Moreira and Wichert (2014, 2016) into a quantum-like influence diagram. Influence diagrams
are designed for knowledge representation. They are a directed acyclic compact graph struc-
ture that represents a full probabilistic description of a decision problem by using probabilistic
inferences performed in Bayesian networks (Koller and Friedman, 2009) together with a fully
deterministic utility function. Currently, influence diagrams have a vast amount of applications.
They can be used to determine the value of imperfect information on both carcinogenic activ-
ity and human exposure (Howard and Matheson, 2005), the are used to detect imperfections in
manufacturing and they can even be used for team decision analysis (Detwarasiti and Shachter,
2005), valuing real options (Lander and Shenoy, 2001), etc.
Although we are aware that more studies need to be conducted in this direction, the prelimi-
nary results obtained in this study show that the quantum-like Bayesian network can be extended
to deal with decision-making scenarios by incorporating the notion of maximum expected utility
in influence diagrams. The general idea is to take advantage of the quantum interference terms
produced in the quantum-like Bayesian network to influence the probabilities used to compute
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the expected utility. This way, we are not proposing a new type of expected utility hypothesis.
On the contrary, we are keeping it under its classical definition. We are only incorporating it as
an extension of a quantum-like probabilistic graphical model where the utility node depends only
on the probabilistic inferences of the quantum-like Bayesian network.
This notion of influence diagrams opens several new research paths. One can incorporate
different utility nodes being influenced by different random variables of the quantum-like Bayesian
Network. This way one can even explore different interference terms affecting different utility
nodes, etc. We plan to carry on with this study and further develop these ideas in future research.
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